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ABSTRACT: Decision-making is becoming increasingly complex as the number of stakeholders 
rises, the number of decision-makers rises as well, the implications to consider are various and far-
reaching, risks and uncertainties abound and the regulatory framework is growing increasingly 
complex. Decision-making is caught between the need to thoroughly document and substantiate a 
choice in front of oneself and others, on one hand, and the potential traps that increase in number 
and impact as the complexity of the decision-making process increases, on the other hand. The 
present paper sought to present critically the main types of downfalls that a decision-making model 
may face at the level of an individual decision-maker. Our approach was to put into relation some 
of  the  most  notable  contributions  from  various  perspectives  in  order  to  obtain  an  integrated 
overview of the challenges faced by decision sciences in formulating a both thorough and life-like 
decision-making model. We identified with this occasion three main potential weaknesses in formal 
decision modeling: unquantifiable factors, such  as feelings or morals, excessive formalism and 
simplification of models that make them vulnerable to paradoxes, and finally cognitive biases that 
deviate models from an objective path. Though scientific literature on each of these topics abounds, 
it is time to integrate it and set the basis for comprehensive and multi-perspective modeling of 
decisions. 
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Mathematical  models,  matrixes  and  equations  are  regarded  by  some  as  the  exclusive 
instruments of exact sciences such as mathematics, physics with all its ramifications, chemistry and 
the like. The degree of real-life applicable structuring and abstractisation of problems depends on 
each  individual’s  predisposition  and  even  academic  formation  in  exact  or  humanistic  sciences. 
Whether a general best practice can be prescribed is still a matter of debate among scholars. No 
sooner had the first attempts to define the decision-making process been formulated that critics were 
addressed from all perspectives. While initially basing his research on the paradigm of „economic 
man”, or „homo economicus”, as a perfectly rational creature whose only goal is to maximize his 
own utility through extensive and coherent cognitive processes, Simon is among the most notable 
detractors of this construct (Simon, 1957). Instead, he uses uncertainty and bounded rationality to 
define „organizational man”. Unlike economic man, organizational man does not display a perfect 
rationality, but rather a bounded one. Unlike economic man, organizational man does not seek to 
optimize, but rather to find a satisfactory outcome, to „satisfice”. However, the scientific approach 
to problem-solving is maintained through clearly specified objectives, well-defined goals, and a 
continuous bearing  in  mind of the problem overview while participants to the decision-making 
process seek satisfactory or sufficient solutions in addressing the problem. More extreme critics 
completely  by-pass  problem-solving  approaches  due  to  overwhelming  interference  caused  by 
                                                 
1  The  Bucharest  Academy  of  Economic  Studies,  Doctoral  School,  Romania,  e-mail: 
catalina_oana_popescu@yahoo.com Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
 
  135 
political interest (Bacharach and Baratz, 1970). These authors observe how the motivation of every 
form of action is a political one, to the point where certain aspects are deliberately kept off the 
decision  agenda;  those  defining  the  decision  agenda  or  the  problem  are  therefore  those  who 
determine to a large extent the outcome of the decision. A more moderate view along the same lines 
states open problems, admitting that the main concern is a political one, in that information is still 
filtered and that political interests are the ones dictating negotiations (Pettigrew, 1973). All these 
aspects may be somewhat encompassed in a view of decision sequence: the fact that an authority 
makes a decision at one moment limits the decisions of an entire group at all subsequent moments, 
just as a decision an individual takes may limit all his/ her future options (an extreme example 
would be a decision to commit suicide successfully carried out which would end all future choices). 
We therefore consider appropriate to adopt a „bottom-up” approach – examine how individuals 
arrive  at  decisions  and  then  how  they  adapt  this  process  according  to  the  others  and  their 
environment. 
We will attempt to identify and briefly analyze the main barriers people may encounter in 
formulating and pursuing a well-structured decision-making model. This presentation is limited to 
individual  decision-making  and  does  not analyze decision-making  in organization; such  studies 
observe rather the interaction of individuals within an organizational environment with numerous 
and various stakeholders and a set of rules, regulations and guidelines. We structured the barriers 
for  structured  decision-making  into  factors  affecting  the  objectives  and  criteria  observed 
(unquantifiable  factors),  factors  affecting  the  structuring  of  these  objectives  and  criteria  (over-
simplified models that degenerate into paradoxes), and factors biasing the entire process and leading 
to unconscious „computing errors” (biases). 
 
Unquantifiable factors  
Loomes and Sugden proposed an entire theory of regret where the utility of the chosen 
alternative depended not only on the opportunity cost, but also on the utility of the alternatives 
sacrificed, through an effect of regretting a larger utility or, on the contrary, rejoicing in making a 
good choice (which would  yield the greatest utility among available alternatives)( Loomes and 
Sugden,  1982).  A  function  is  then  defined  to  give  mathematical  expression  to  this  concept. 
Although the proposition seems intuitive and seems to convey a more accurate account of the utility 
actually felt by the decision-maker, transposing regret and joy into a mathematical function seems 
more of a scholarly exercise then a practical method. Furthermore, the perceived „success” of the 
choice  influences  the  utility  perceived  after  the  actual  decision  has  been  taken  –  it  would  for 
instance be interesting to observe the measure in which decision-makers perceive a gain inferior to 
another potential gain as a loss. In estimating utilities modified by regret or rejoicing prior to the 
decision, anticipating either feeling would more likely act as a perceived grater stake in the decision 
and therefore create greater anxiety for the decision-maker. Moreover, if the consequences of an 
action are preferred to those of another action, this in itself would constitute the motivation of 
choosing  one  action  over  another,  without  a  bonus  or  penalty  of  emotional  affect.  Regret  or 
rejoicing would only motivate the decision-maker to make the best efforts in choosing wisely, that 
is to fundament his/ her decision thoroughly. Resented pressure, on the other hand, could lead to 
negative psychological states and therefore lead to a disutility of the decision process in itself.  
Besides the relativity of the decision maker’s position towards him-/ herself, there is the 
matter of the positioning with respect to other stakeholders. Wolff remarqued how “game theory is 
only capable of providing a formal analysis in situations where one pursues maximizing egotistical 
values” (Wolff, 1962). As a proposition to extend the model, he introduced the so-called contextual 
altruism as a case for dependency between the values obtained as a result of a game; in other words 
the utility of one player affects the utility of the other. This influence may be positive, if the player 
desires the other player’s well-being, or negative if for whatever reasons the player desires the other 
player’s  downfall.  In  a  simple  case  of  altruism  one  player  would  replace  his/  her  own  utility Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
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expected from a decision by that of the other player. Contextual altruism adds to the construct by 
introducing inter-personal compared utilities.  This abstraction allows the consideration of costs 
associated with obtaining an expected result – if, for instance, by using the same means, the utility 
of one player is greatly superior to that of the other player, then he/ she would be less inclined to 
follow an  altruistic principle,  but would rather resent high personal stakes  versus  little relative 
impact on the other. Though this principle makes intuitive sense, giving it a numerical interpretation 
poses more problems. One option in this respect would be to introduce in the utility function of one 
player a special function g such as  
 
                  (1), 
 
where fi and fj would be the egotistical utility functions of players i and j and g is the impact of the 
relation between own egotistical gain and the gain of the other player. 
In an extremely simplified but illustrative case, the function may be expressed as 
 
               (2) 
 
Presuming that the players are benevolent towards each other and desire the good of one 
another. Then a would be a positive parameter and 1/a would express the level of damage that the 
player may accept to be inflicted onto the other player in order for him-/ herself to obtain one unit 
of egotistical utility. Similarly, if the players are malevolent towards each other (for instance rivals 
or otherwise enemies), then a would be a negative parameter and 1/a would represent the level of 
utility that one player may accept to be bestowed upon his/ her opponent in order for him-/ herself 
to obtain one unit of egotistical utility. The situation becomes more complicated to the point of 
paradox when the other player also implements a similar „cross-utility” function. If the weight of 
this cross-utility is sufficiently high with respect to the egotistical utility within the overall utility 
(meaning if a*fj(·)/Ui is significant), then we can observe an effect of circularity: one player knows 
that the other player wishes his benefit in a substantial degree, and that his benefit therefore greatly 
contributes to the other player’s benefit. But the other player’s benefit is also greatly important to 
the overall utility of the player in question. Therefore, if one player is greatly concerned with the 
other player’s utility, and the other player is greatly concerned with the first player’s utility, then for 
the sake of the other player the first player will pursue his own egotistical interest. This intuitive 
outcome may also be observed in terms of formal functions. May the following adjustments be 
made to equation (2) above: 
                  (3) 
                  (4) 
We would then obtain 
 =>                 (5) 
 =>                 (6) 
We  could  make  the  further  assumption  that the  players  desire  each  other’s  benefit  in  a 
somewhat smaller degree then that of their own, meaning that in order to obtain one unit of utility 
they would accept that the other player would suffer disutility of several units, meaning 1/a, with 
1/a greater then 1 and therefore a smaller then 1. In this case 
 
ai*aj   => (1-ai*aj )   => 1/(1-ai*aj ) >1. 
 
Therefore, this mutual moderate consideration of the players for one another, expressed by 
positive and subunitary coefficients ai and aj, would translate into a greater motivation for each Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
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player to enhance both him/ herself’s, as well as the other’s benefit. (as, as opposed to the former 
equation (2), the utility function is now multiplied by an supraunitary real number 1/(1-ai*aj )). 
  This model unfortunately proves unviable under the presumption that one player could only 
accept one unit of utility if this would not inflict upon the other player a disutility greater then 1/a 
units, where 1/a   and therefore a >1. In this scenario (1-ai*aj ) < 0, which would transform 
both utilities into disutilities, which does not make logical sense. Equations (5) and (6) would also 
be rendered unusable if ai = aj =1. In non-mathematical terms, this would mean that the utility of the 
other player is just as important to either player as his/ her own. Discussing the range of a, we 
would have to admit that a scenario where a   would mean that the player would accept to 
„steel” utility from the other player at an inefficient „transfer rate” – he/ she would have the other 
suffer a disutility of several units so that he/ she could gain one unit of utility. Although plausible, 
such model contradicts in part the concept of altruism. We applied the limitation „in part” as the 
very introduction of such a concept and such a coefficient as a means that there are limitations to 
the length a player would go to satisfy his/ her own interest at the expense of others. This breach in 
morals cannot however be considered the norm, so we have to admit a ≥ 1 as the base scenario, 
under which no mathematical conclusion can be reached. We should also mention that contextual 
altruism is a different construct from cooperation in the case of classical games. The latter express 
rather a joint effort in reaching egotistical ends, and competition is not excluded by motivations 
pertaining to the players, but it is rather avoided because the circumstances render it inefficient or 
ineffective. From an ideological perspective, the debate of contextual altruism is rich in arguments, 
from  human  capacity  to  fulfill  oneself  only  inside  society  maintained  by  Aristotle  to  the 
consideration not of actions, but of their motivations (Schelling, 1968). However, as seen above, 
such a personal matter cannot easily be accommodated by mathematical models in a manner that is 
easy to understand and apply. 
 
Paradoxes – over-simplified models 
One of the more common criticisms to decision sciences is that „Knowledge on interaction 
between decisions, decision-makers and decision processes is extremely fragmented” (Davidsen, 
Spector şi Ullah, 2008). The implications of this accusation  state that the  models and  methods 
developed so far do not address decision problems in an integrated manner from the multitude of 
perspectives that they face. In other words, the desire to provide a structured decision model despite 
the extensive description that characterizes each decision context led to unsatisfying simplifications. 
The faults of proposed models are apparent in the various paradoxes that they bear. Buridan’s ass 
would die of hunger, incapable to choose between two alternatives of identical utility, be it two hay 
stacks of equal size situated at an equal distance from it. Confronted with choices between risk and 
uncertainty, some players would rather make suboptimal choices by any estimation rather than face 
uncertainty  by  making  personal  assumptions  (Ellsberg,  1961).  In  another  case  known  as  the 
Newcomb paradox, two assessment methods lead to different conclusions (Nozick, 1969). In the 
Sankt Petersburg paradox, players would have to pay an infinity to compensate for the chances of 
winning. It would seem that playing with numbers give numbers free reign to play with us – „If all 
we wanted was a way to pick one action from among many at any moment, then assigning real 
numbers (as opposed to some other ordered object) seems like overkill. And this is right – the great 
power of these results demands very strong conditions.” (Easwaran, 2009). 
The simple emergence of paradoxes is not in itself an indication of a deeply flawed or false 
theory. Logics, for instance, provides us with an entertaining list of such finds, starting from the 
undeterminable validity of the sentence „This sentence is false”. However, the range of paradoxes 
in  the  case  of  decision  theory  raises  questions  as  to  the  pertinence  of  the  models  suggested, 
specifically expected value and expected utility.  
The Sankt Petersburg paradox proposes a game where a coin is tossed; if the „tails” face 
appears, then the player wins 1 monetary unit, for instance one coin. If the „heads” face appears, Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
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then the coin is tossed again. This time, if the „tails” face appears, then the player wins 2 coins, and 
if the „heads” face appears, then the coin is tossed again, and so forth. Each time the „heads” face 
appears, the prize doubles. The player receives the prize when the „tails” face appears and the game 
ends (Samuelson, 1960). If ½ is the probability that either face appears on each toss of the coin, 




The  famous  solution  Bernoulli  found  was  the  introduction  of  the  utility  concept.  This 
however addressed half of the problem, namely the part concerned with values, by attaching to it a 
more abstract construct, that of utility. This solution is not without downfalls, however, as the actual 
utility is filtered by human perception and therefore subjective and difficult to quantify. The other 
half of the problem is concerned with probability, rick and uncertainty. There are of course cases 
such as the tossing of a coin or of a dice where mathematical probabilities are obvious and there is 
only  a  matter  of  risk.  Most  often,  however,  decision-makers  are  faced  with  situations  where 
uncertainty also  lingers – that is, actual probabilities are unknown. This case, of both risk and 
uncertainty, is illustrated in the Ellsberg paradox. 
A player would be presented with an urn containing 90 balls, out of which 30 red and 60 of 
other colors, either yellow or black. The player is asked to choose between two gambles: one where 
he/ she wins a prize if a red ball is extracted, and one where he/ she wins a prize if a black ball in 
extracted. The player is then asked between two other lotteries: one where he/ she wins a prize if 
either a red or yellow ball is extracted, and one where he/ she wins a prize if either a black or yellow 
ball  is  extracted  (Ellsberg,  1961).  Most  participants  to the  experiment  however  chose  the  first 
gamble in the first case and the second gamble in the second case. In the first case, the player knew 
that there was exactly a 33.33% chance of a  red ball being extracted, but did not know the chances 
of a black ball being extracted. Similarly, in the second case the player knew the chances of either a 
black or yellow ball being extracted were 66.66%, but did not know the chances of either a red or 
yellow ball being extracted. So players most often fall back on those choices whose chances they 
can estimate. Instead, this proves a suboptimal choice under decision-theoretical analysis. Suppose 
that  the  player  makes  the  presumption  that  there  are  more  yellow  balls  then  there  are  black, 
meaning there are more than 30 yellow balls and less than 30 black ones. Then in the first case, the 
player  should  chose  the  first  lottery,  and  in  the  second  case  the  first  lottery.  For  an  opposite 
assumption,  the  opposite  applies.  So  under  any  assumption  or  distribution  between  black  and 
yellow balls, adversity towards uncertainty prompts a suboptimal choice. 
In  dealing  with  both  values/  utilities  and  probabilities/  risk/  uncertainty,  mathematical 
decision models present therefore a weakness hard to overcome – that of subjective judgment that 
does not easily subject itself to mathematical formulation. In response, some models have been 
drafted based not on utility functions, but on preference and indifference relations between them to 
derive a total ordering (Easwaran, 2007). However, the conclusion reached until this point is that 
„there probably is no hope of extending decision theory properly to a linear ordering on all actions” 
(Easwaran, 2007). The debate whether such an attempt should even be made knowing that in some 
cases decision-makers are genuinely indifferent between several alternative still stands. However, in 
arriving to such preferences a decision-maker still needs to construct criteria, estimate outcomes, 
and generally expose him- /herself to all sources of inadequacy that haunt expected utility models. 
An advantage of dominance-based theory remains that in replacing coefficients with preferences, it 
seems more intuitive and user-friendly.  
 
Biases as computing errors 
Cognitive biases represent thinking patterns based on observations and generalisations that 
can lead to memory errors, inexact judgments and flawed logic (Stanovich et al., 2008). Cognitive Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
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biases include, but are not limited to: hindsight bias (manifested through perceiving the inevitability 
of an event once it has occured), omission bias (tendency to omit information perceived as risky), 
confirmation  bias  (tendency  to  observe  especially  the  information  that  confirms  previously 
formulated  conceptions  and  hypothesis)  (Stanovich  et  al.,  2008).  In  taking  decisions,  cognitive 
biases determine individuals to base their judgment excessively or mainly on previous expectations 
or knowledge and to not allow sufficient attention to information perceived as uncertain (Dietrich, 
2010). Such individuals will not form a realistic overview and so the fundamentation of the decision 
is exposed to multiple risks of error. What is disconcerting is not that such phenomena occur, but 
that empirical studies have recorded that they occur on a large scale and even among the most 
educated (Yudkowsky, 2008), leaving some to wonder whether they represent the norm rather than 
the  exception.  Events  such  as  economic  bubbles  and  crashes  and  even  political  events  are  an 
additional argument in favor of the human mind’s limitations and therefore its ability to make lucid, 
perfectly fundamented and objective decisions (Ex. Taleb, 2007). 
 
Empirical study 
In order to gather the opinions of real-life decision-makers on the obstacles they encounter, 
we deployed an online questionnaire asking respondents to simply list the main impediments or 
difficulties they face when taking decisions. For this purpose we employed the services of one of 
the free online survey platforms. In order to better analyze the phenomenon, the questionnaire also 
included  demographic  questions  referring  to  age,  level  of  income,  tenure  in  the  organization, 
educational  level  and  marital  status.  Various  business  professionals  from  the  consulting  and 
banking industries in Romania, as well as researchers, were then invited via e-mail to complete the 
brief questionnaire, and as a result a number of 120 answers were collected for analysis. After 
reading all freely-formulated answers, we were able to identify three major areas of reference. 
The  first  major  concern  respondents  expressed  was  that  of  information  availability  or 
reliability.  32.5%  or  respondents  specifically  mentioned  lack  of  information  among  the  factors 
making decisions difficult. Another 5% invoked correctness and precision of the information. 
A second general issue that emerged was that of the complex relationship established with 
people  around the decision-maker. This area was addressed  by 30% of respondents. The exact 
manifestation of this issue, however, took very different forms, ranging from resentment of external 
intervention (in 15% of cases) to conflict between own opinions and preferences and those of other 
people and social criticism (5% of cases) and, on the other hand, concern for the decision’s impact 
on  others,  especially  dear  ones,  need  or  desire  to  consult  with  others  and  obtain  consensus  or 
approval (17.5% of cases). This general factor can therefore have either positive connotations, when 
the decision-maker seeks support and concerns over the welfare of others, or negative connotations, 
if the decision-maker experiences or perceives social restraints. 
A majority of 57.5% of respondents, however, still cited own inner conflicts as the main 
reason for which they feel some decisions as being difficult. 32.5% of respondents mentioned own 
indecision, hesitation and variability of preferences. Contrary to folklore, a majority of 56.4% of 
these were men, despite the fact that 54.17% of respondents were women. 10.85% mentioned the 
risks involved and own risk aversion as obstacles, while another 8.33% stated to fear the results of 
their own decisions. The conflict of emotional and rational aspects was also brought up by 7.5% of 
respondents. Interestingly, none of the respondents acknowledged manifesting cognitive biases or 
doubting the correctness with which they would define and implement a decision model; what all 
these claims refer to instead is the input data for such a model and the difficulty of accommodating 
sometimes conflicting desired outcomes. 
Another  15%  of  respondents  named  time  constraints  as  factors  of  complexity,  mostly 
because such restrictions undermine a careful and thorough analysis of the situation and require 
intuition, experience or spontaneity that not all people are able to display all of the time.  Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(1), 2011 
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Although  slight  differences  between  demographic  groups  were  inevitable,  none  of  these 
were ample enough to be considered significant. One exception is the reaction to lack of accurate 
information – 51.11% of those complaining about such an obstacle were aged under 30 (in the total 
sample this demographic accounted for 47.5% of participants). A possible hypothesis to explain this 
phenomenon  could  be  that  decision-makers  accumulate  experience  by  repeatedly  facing  such  a 
common shortcoming, experience materialized through both intuition and methods of minimizing 
the impact of the missing information in the decision model. In other words, in time decision-
makers acquire a certain immunity to this state of facts or at least become resigned to it. 
To  sum  up,  although  objective  factors  such  as  pertaining  to  constraints  of  time  and 
information  are  duly  recognized  as  contributing  to  the  difficulty  of  decisions,  they  are  clearly 
outweighed  by  subjective  factors characteristic  of the decision-maker’s own person and  his/her 
relations to other people.  
 
Conclusions 
Albert Einstein has famously said that „Not everything that can be counted counts, and not 
everything that counts can be counted.” This predicament is especially troublesome in the delicate 
art of decision-making, where the need to thoroughly fundament a choice in front of oneself and 
others  is  undermined  by  the  relativity  involved  in  this  fundamentation.  We  have  attempted  to 
identify the main factors that may affect a decision model’s adequacy in order to pave the way for 
further research on the influence each one has and on the way they interact. A short experiment has 
shown that decision-makers hardly complain about the difficulty of formulating a decision model, 
and only a minority of them finds it difficult to populate such a hypothetical model with necessary 
data within the given timeframe. Instead, the real challenge identified was of accommodating the 
diverging tendencies, preferences and conceptions governing themselves and their role in society in 
a manner that they may find hard to understand. Their quest is therefore not a mathematical or 
operational one, but rather of a psychological and even sociological nature, prompting for inter-
disciplinary studies. The findings of such thorough research could be used to redefine decision-
making models in a manner that is both life-like and thorough and could therefore constitute a tool 
for both decision-makers and researchers in decision sciences. 
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